Signed, Scanned, Delivered? Decoding Digital Delivery In Arbitral Award Timelines

CCL NLUO
4 days ago
6 min read

Updated: 1 day ago

Authors: Yash Pathak and Madiha Ehsan

Second year students at Institute of Finance and International Management School of Law, Bangalore

I. Introduction: Arbitration In A Paper(Less) Paradigm

"The law does not concern itself with trifles, but in arbitration, even the mode of delivery can alter the timeline of justice."[1]

— Adapted from de minimis non curat lex

Richard Susskind, Oxford professor,[2] predicted that all courts worldwide will have to transform along with technological advancements.[3]

In the increasingly digitisation of modern arbitral procedures, the traditional communication style—registered posts, hardbound compilations, sealed envelopes – is giving way to PDF attachments, encrypted emails, and electronic platforms. Yet, procedural law often struggles to reconcile its formalist past with this functionalist present.

The recent judgment by the Delhi High Court [“DHC”] in Kristal Vision Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India [“Kristal Vision”], squarely addresses one such intersection: whether the non-delivery of a physical signed copy of an arbitral award can invalidate the dismissal of a Section 34 petition on limitation grounds when a digitally signed award was already acknowleged by the other party.

The Court answered in the negative, affirming that where a signed and authenticated copy is communicated via email and acknowledged by an authorised person, it qualifies as valid delivery under Section 31(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [“A&C Act”], thereby triggering the limitation clock under Section 34(3).

In this article, the author attempts to analyse a broader jurisprudential aspect of what constitutes "delivery", its doctrinal foundations, comparison with the Model Law, harmonisation, and its future trajectory in digitising arbitration.

II. Reading Sections 31(5) And 34(3) Together

At the heart of the issue lies the statutory coupling of Section 31(5) and Section 34(3) of the A&C Act. The former provides that a “signed copy of the award shall be delivered to each party”. At the same time, the latter prescribes a three-month limitation for challenging such an award, commencing from the date the party “received the arbitral award.”

This interrelation has been the subject of considerable judicial scrutiny, in State of Maharashtra v. ARK Builders Pvt. Ltd, SC clarified that limitation under Section 34(3) begins only upon actual or effective delivery of the signed award, not merely the date of pronouncement or circulation of an unsigned draft.

Here, the award, although not handed over physically, was scanned, signed, emailed, and acknowledged by the appellant’s authorised representative. The appellant sought to claim that the limitation only began from the date the physical copy was received, months later.

Rejecting this contention, the DHC emphasised a functional approach: the statutory requirement of “delivery” does not insist on physical handover if the purpose, notice, authenticity, and finality are otherwise fulfilled.

III. What Constitutes "Delivery"?

The jurisprudential underpinning of the term "delivery" in arbitration law has evolved from its Anglo-Indian roots to incorporate modern notions of constructive notice and technological authentication.

In Tecco Trichy Engineers v. Union of India, the SC held that delivery must be made to the party itself, not merely to a person incidentally informed of the award. However, courts have also recognised that delivery to an authorised agent or counsel—especially if the award is acknowledged—suffices.

The ruling in Kristal Vision adopts a teleological interpretive approach, asking: What is the purpose of Section 31(5)? It is not to sanctify form, but to ensure:

The party has actual notice of the final, binding decision;
The award is signed, reflecting its authenticity;
The mode of delivery is reliable, traceable, and acknowledged.

Thus, “delivery” must be purposively interpreted to include signed, scanned copies sent via authenticated electronic means, particularly when modern communication is instantaneous and acknowledgement is digitally auditable.

This position also aligns with Indian evidentiary law. Under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, emails are admissible as valid evidence of communication, provided authenticity can be seen in the judgment of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kishanrao Goratyal. In Kristal Vision, the presence of an email trail, acknowledgement, and copying to the Managing Director fulfilled these evidentiary standards.s.

IV. The Global Gospel Of Award Delivery

India’s A&C Act draws heavily from the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, which contains an analogous provision in Article 31(5). The Travaux Préparatoires and the UNCITRAL 2012 Digest reveal that delivery under the model law need not be physical. Instead, it requires that the signed copy reach the party through a means that ensures receipt and authenticity.

The jurisprudence in other Model Law jurisdictions supports this:

Singapore: In CRW Joint Operation v. PT Perusahaan Gas Negara, the Court accepted that emailing a signed award to the counsel of record constituted proper delivery.
United Kingdom: Under Section 55 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, parties are free to agree on the mode of delivery.
Hong Kong: Rules 2.16 and 3.1 of the HKIAC Administered Arbitration Rules 2024 permit parties to use any means of communication, including email, for the conduct of proceedings and delivery of documents.

Sir Geoffrey Vos, Master of the Rolls of England & Wales, while delivering a speech at a lecture. He said this:

As I have been saying for some time now, digitisation, is going to change both the kinds of disputes that need to be resolved and the way in which commercial parties will want and require them to be resolved. It seems unlikely that parties transacting instantaneously on-chain are going to want to wait years to resolve their disputes traditionally.

Therefore, Kristal Vision aligns India with a pro-arbitration regime. It is also aligned with the New York Convention’s pro-enforcement bias, which discourages the use of obstructive technicalities. Moreover, this development aligns with international instruments such as Article 3 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which permits service of communications by means that provide a record of transmission. Several institutional arbitration rules—such as SIAC Rule 52 & 53, ICC Article 35, and HKIAC Article 39—similarly permit electronic delivery of awards unless the parties have opted out.

V. Constructive Notice And Digital Authority

Beyond its primary ruling on what constitutes valid delivery under Section 31(5) of the ACA, Kristal Vision indirectly reaffirms two foundational doctrines that animate procedural law: constructive notice and delegated procedural authority.

A. Constructive Notice through Authorized Receipt

The doctrine of constructive notice holds that notice to a duly authorized agent is deemed notice to the principal. In Kristal Vision, the Supreme Court upheld this principle, finding that emailing the award to an authorized representative—who acknowledged receipt and copied the MD—constituted valid delivery.

For instance, in English law, the doctrine of constructive service allows service of documents upon solicitors if they are on record. Similarly, Rule 5.4C of the English Civil Procedure Rules reflects the understanding that notice to counsel or a designated recipient suffices, especially when the communication is traceable and acknowledged.

B. The Doctrine of Receipt over Dispatch

Equally significant is the Court's reaffirmation of the doctrine of receipt over dispatch—the concept is embedded in both Indian & international practice. This doctrine posits that for limitation purposes, it is not the date of dispatch of an award or decision that matters, but the date when it is received and acknowledged by the party or their authorized representative. It stems from the principle that limitation cannot begin to run unless the party has a fair and effective opportunity to access the decision and assess its legal implications.

The High Court in Kristal Vision emphasized this nuance by observing that even though the award was emailed on 16.10.2023, the limitation under Section 34(3) began only when the email was received and acknowledged, not merely when sent. This distinction ensures fairness and predictability—it prevents arbitral parties from being penalised for non-receipt due to technological glitches, server failures, or improper addressing. Once receipt and acknowledgement are established, the parties cannot delay the limitation timeline on a technical issue.

DHC established a four-fold test to determine the legitimacy of delivery:

First, that the award was in its final and signed form, not merely a draft or working version;
Second, that it was sent to a specific, authorised individual, not to a generic inbox or undisclosed recipient;
Third, that there existed a verifiable email trail demonstrating receipt, opening, and acknowledgement;
Fourth, that the party did not register any contemporaneous objection or protest regarding non-receipt, delay, or defective transmission.

VI. Conclusion

The judgment in Kristal Vision is more than a procedural footnote—it is a doctrinal affirmation of arbitration's adaptability. By holding that digital delivery of a signed award is sufficient for triggering limitation under Section 34(3), the Delhi High Court advances a jurisprudence that is context-sensitive, technology-friendly, and internationally harmonised & emphasises the value of “E-delivery”.

It corrects the anachronism of equating “delivery” solely with physicality. However, courts must continue to exercise scrutiny in digital delivery cases. Not all emails are equal. The award must be signed, the recipient must be authorised, and the communication must be traceable. Digital convenience must not dilute procedural integrity.

Ultimately, the law must mirror the world it regulates. In the age of arbitral e-filing platforms, virtual hearings, and AI-assisted drafting, insisting on paper delivery is not diligence—it is delay disguised as due process.

[1] Steve Coughlan, ‘Why De Minimis Should Not Be a Defence’ (2018) 44 Queen’s Law Journal 262.

[2] PB Marrow, K Mansi and S Kuyan, ‘Artificial Intelligence and Arbitration: The Computer as an Arbitrator – Are We There Yet?’ (2020) 74 Dispute Resolution Journal 48.

[3] Marta Łągiewska, ‘New Technologies in International Arbitration: A Game-Changer in Dispute Resolution?’ (2024) 37 International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 851 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-023-10070-7.

Note: This article has been reviewed by Mr. Ketan Parikh (Senior Counsel, High Court of Bombay), at the Tier II Stage.